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Thirty years ago in Science, Garrett 
Hardin introduced the metaphor 
"tragedy of the commons" to help 
explain overpopulation, air 
pollution, and species extinction. 
People often overuse resources 
they own in common because they 
have no incentive to conserve. 
Today, Hardin's metaphor is central 
to debates in economics, law, and 
science and powerful justification 
for privatizing commons property. 
While the metaphor highlights the 
cost of overuse when governments 
allow too many people to use a 
scarce resource, it misses the 
possibility of underuse when 
governments give too many 
people rights to exclude others. 
Privatization can solve one tragedy, 
but cause another. 
Since Hardin's article appeared, bio- 
medical research has been moving from a 
commons model toward a privatization 
model. Under the commons model, the 
federal government sponsored pre-market 
or "upstream" research and encouraged 
broad dissemination of results in the pub- 
lic domain. Unpatented biomedical dis- 
coveries were freely incorporated in 
"downstream" products for diagnosing 
and treating disease. In 1980, in an effort 
to promote commercial development of 
new technologes, Congress began encour- 
aging universities and other institutions to 
patent discoveries arising from federally 
supported research and development and 
to transfer their technology to the private 
sector. Supporters applaud the resulting 
increase in patent filings and private 
investment, while critics fear deterioration 
in the culture of upstream research. 
Building on Heller's theory of anticom- 
mons property, this article identifies an 
unintended and paradoxical consequence 
of biomedical pnvatization: a proliferation 
of intellectual property rights upstream 
may be stifling life-saving innovations fur- 
ther downstream in the course of research 
and product development. 
THE TRAGEDY OF THE 
ANTICOMMONS 
Anticommons property can best be 
understood as the mirror i m a ~ e  of com- 
mons property. A resource is prone to 
overuse in a tragedy of the commons when 
too many owners each have a privilege to 
use a given resource, and no one has a 
right to exclude another. By contrast, a 
resource is prone to underuse in a tragedy 
of the anticommons when multiple owners 
each have a right to exclude others from a 
scarce resource, and no one has an effec- 
tive privilege of use. In theory, in a world 
of costless transactions, people could 
always avoid commons or anticommons 
tragedy by trading their rights. In practice, 
however, avoiding tragedy requires over- 
coming transaction costs, strategic behav- 
iors, and cognitive biases of participants, 
with success more likely within close-knit 
communities than among hostile strangers. 
Once an anticommons emerges, collecting 
rights into usable private property is often 
brutal and slow. 
Privatization in post-socialist 
economies starkly illustrates how anti- 
commons property can emerge and per- 
sist. One promise of transition to markets 
was that new entrepreneurs would fill 
stores that socialist rule had left bare. Yet 
after several years of reform, many priva- 
tized storefronts remained empty, while 
flimsy metal kiosks, stocked full of goods, 
mushroomed up on the streets. Why did 
the new merchants not come in from the 
cold? One reason was that transition gov- 
ernments often failed to endow any indi- 
vidual with a bundle of rights that repre- 
sents full ownership. Instead, fragmented 
rights were distributed to various socialist- 
era stakeholders, including private or 
quasi-private enterprises, workers' collec- 
tives, privatization agencies, and local, 
regional, and federal governments. No 
one could set up shop without first col- 
lecting rights from each of the other own- 
ers. 
Privatization of upstream biomedical 
research in the United States may create 
anticommons property that is less visible 
than empty storefronts, but even more 
economically and socially costly. In this 
setting, privatization takes the form of 
intellectual property claims to the sorts of 
research results that, in an earlier era, 
would have been made freely available in 
the public domain. Responding to a shift 
in U.S. government policy in the past two 
decades, research institutions such as the 
National Institutes of Health (NIH) and 
major universities have created technology 
transfer offices to patent and license their 
discoveries. At the same time, commercial 
biotechnology firms have emerged in 
research and development (R&D) niches 
somewhere between the proverbial "fun- 
damental" research of academic laborato- 
ries and the targeted product development 
of pharamaceutical firms. Today, upstream 
research in the biomedical sciences is 
increasingly likely to be "private" in one 
or more senses of the term - supported 
by private f ~ n d s ,  camed out in a private 
institution, or privately appropriated 
through patents, trade secrecy, or agree- 
ments that restrict the use of materials 
and data. 
In biomedical research, as in post- 
socialist transition, privatization holds 
both promises and risks. Patents and 
other forms of intellectual property pro- 
tection for upstream discoveries may forti- 
fy incentives to undertake risky research 
projects and could lead to a more equi- 
table distribution of profits across all 
stages of R&D. But privatization can go 
astray when too many owners hold rights 
in prior discoveries that constitute obsta- 
cles to future research. Upstream patent 
rights, initially offered to help attract fur- 
ther private investment, are increasingly 
regarded as entitlements by those who do 
research with public funds. A researcher 
who may have felt entitled to co-author- 
ship or a citation in an earlier era may 
now feel entitled to be a co-inventor on a 
patent or to receive a royalty under a 
material transfer agreement. The result h a  
been a spiral of overlapping patent claims 
in the hands of different owners, reaching 
ever further upstream in the course of 
])io~nedical research. Researchers and their 
institutions may resent restrictions on 
access to the patented discoveries of oth- 
ers, yeL nobody wants LO be the last one 
left dedicating findings to the public 
domain. 
The problem we identify is distinct 
from the routine underuse inherent in any 
well-func~ioning patenL system. By confer- 
ring monopolies in discoveries, patents 
necessarily increase prices and restrict use 
- a cost society pays to motivate inven- 
lion and disclosure. The tragedy of the 
anticommons refers to the more complex 
obstacles that arise when a user needs 
access to multiple patented inputs in 
order to create a single useful product. 
Each upstream patent allows its owner to 
set up another tollbooth on the road to 
product development, adding to the cost 
and slowing the pace of downstream bio- 
medical innovation. 
HOW A BIOMEDICAL 
ANTICOMMONS MAY ARISE 
Current exan~ples in biomedical 
research demonstrate two mechanisms by 
which a government might inadvertently 
create an anticommons: either by creating 
too inany concurrelzt frlzgrneizts of intellec- 
tual property rights in poten~ial future 
products or by permitting too many 
upstream patent owners to stack liceizses 
on top of the future discoveries of down- 
stream users. 
Concurrent Fragments. The anticom- 
inons model urovides one wav of under- 
standing a widespread intuition that issu- 
ing patents on gene fragments makes little 
sense. Throughout the 19805, patents on 
genes generally corresponded closely to 
foreseeable commercial products, such as 
therapeutic proteins or diagnostic tests for 
recognized genetic diseases. Then, in 
1991, NIH pointed the way toward 
patenting anonymous gene fragments with 
its notorious patent applications on 
expressed sequence tags (ESTs). NIH sub- 
sequently abandoned these patent applica- 
tions and now takes a more hostile posi- 
tion toward pa~enting ESTs and raw 
genomic DNA sequences. Meanwhile, pri- 
vate firms have stepped in where NIH left 
~ f r ,  filing patent applications on newly 
identified DNA sequences, including gene 
fragments, before identifyng a corre- 
sponding gene, protein, biological func- 
tion, or potential commercial product. 
The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), 
in exanling these claims, could create or 
avoid an anticommons. 
Al~hough a database of gene fragments 
is a useful resource for discovery, defining 
property rights around isolated gene frag- 
ments seems at the outset unlikely to 
track socially useful bundles of property 
rights in future commercial products. 
Foreseeable commercial uroducts. such as 
therapeutic proteins or genetic diagnostic 
tests, are more likely to require use of 
multiple fragments. A proliferation of 
patents on individual fragments held by 
different owners seems inevitably to 
require future costly transactions to bun- 
dle licenses together before a firm can 
have an effective right to develop these 
uroducts 
Patents on receptors useful for screen- 
ing potential pharmaceutical products 
demonstrate another potential "concurrent 
fragment" anticommok in biomedical 
research. To learn as much as possible 
about the therapeutic effects and side 
effects of potential products at the pre- 
clinical stage, firms want to screen prod- 
ucts against all known members of rele- 
vant receptor families. But if these recep- 
tors are patented and controlled by differ- 
ent owners, gathering the necessary 
licenses may be difficult or impossible. A 
recent search of the Lexis patent database 
disclosed more than 100 issued U.S. 
patents with the term "adrenergic recep- 
tor" in the claim language. Such a prolifer- 
ation of claims presents a daunting bar- 
gaining challenge. Unable to procure a 
complete set of licenses, firms choose 
between diverting resources to less 
promising projects with fewer licensing 
obstacles or proceeding to animal and 
then clinic testing on the basis of incom- 
plete information. More thorough in vitm 
screening could avoid premature clinical 
testing that exposes patients to unneces- 
sary risks. 
Long delays between filing and 
issuance of biotechnology patents aggra- 
vate the problem of concurrent fragments. 
During this period of pendency, there is 
substantial uncertainty as to the scope of 
patent rights that will ultimately issue. 
Although US.  patent law does not recog- 
nize enforceable rights in pending patent 
applications, firms and universities typi- 
cally enter into license agreements prior to 
the issuance of patents, and firms raise 
capital based on the inchoate rights pre- 
served by patent filings. In effect, each 
potential patent crea~es a specter of lights 
that may be larger than the actual rights, 
if any, eventually conferred by the PTO. 
Working into the calculations of both 
risk-taking investors and risk-averse prod- 
uct developers. these overlapping patent 
filings may compound the obstacles to 
developing new products. 
Stacking Licenses. The use of reach- 
through license agreements (RTLAs) on 
patented research tools illustrates another 
path by which an anticommons may 
emerge. As we use the term, a RTJA gives 
the owner of a patented invention, used in 
upstream stages of research, rights in sub- 
sequent downstream discoveries. Such 
rights may take the foim of a royalty on 
sales that result from using the upstream 
research tool, an exclusive or nonexclusive 
license on future discoveries, or an option 
to acquire such a license. In principle, 
RTLAs offer advantages to both patent 
holders and researchers. They permit 
researchers with limited funds to use 
patented research tools right away and 
defer payment until the research yelds 
valuable results. Patent holders may also 
prefer a chance at larger payoffs frdm sales 
of downstream products rather than cer- 
tail?, but smaller, upfront fees. In practice 
RTLAs may lead to an anticommons as 
upstream owners stack overlapping and 
inconsistent claims on potential down- 
stream products. In effect, the use of 
RTLAs gives each upstream patent owner 
a continuing right to be present at the 
bargaining table as a research project 
moves downstream toward product devel- 
opment. 
So far. RTIAs have had a mixed receu- 
tion as a mechanism for licensing 
upstream biomedical research patents, but 
they appear to be becoming more preva- 
lent. When Cetus Corporation initially 
proposed RTLAs on any products devil- 
oped through the use of the polymerase 
chain reaction (PCR) in research, they met 
strong resistance from downstream users 
" 
concerned with developing commercial 
products. Later, Hoffmann-La Roche 
acquired the rights to PCR and offered 
licenses that do not include reach-through 
U 
obligations. The resulting pay-as-you-go 
approach increases the up front cost of a 
license to use PCR, but il decreases the 
likelihood of an anticommons emerging. 
More recently, some universities and 
other nonprofit research institutions have 
balked at terms DuPont Corporation has 
offered for licenses to use Datent onco- 
mouse and cre-lox techizologies, although 
others have acquiesced in the license 
terms. These patents cover genetically 
engineered mice u s e f ~ ~ l  in research that 
could lead to products falling outside the 
scope of the patent claims. DuPont has 
offered noncominercial research licenses 
and sublicenses on terms that seem to 
require licensees to return to DuPont for 
further approval before any new discover- 
ies or materials resulting from the use of 
licensed mice are passed along to others 
or used for commercial purposes. DuPont 
thereby gains the right to participate in 
f ~ ~ t u r e  n gotiations to develop commercial 
products that fall outside the scope of 
their patent claims. In effect, the license 
terrns permit DuPont to leverage its pro- 
prietary position in upstream research 
tools into a broad veto right over down- 
stream research and product develop- 
ment. 
As RTLAs to use patented research 
tools multiply, researchers will face 
increasing difficulties conveying clear title 
to firms to develop future discoveries. If a 
particularly valuable commercial product 
is in view, downstream product develop- 
ers might be motivated and able to reach 
agreements with multiple holders of 
RTLAs. But if the prospects for success are 
more uncertain or the expected commer- 
cial value is small, the parties may fail to 
bargain past the anticommons. 
TRANSITION OR TRAGEDY? 
Is a biomedical anticommons likely to 
endure once it emerges? Recent empirical 
literature suggests that communities of 
intellectual property owners who deal 
udth each other on a recurring basis have 
sometimes developed institutions to 
reduce transaction costs of bundling mul- 
tiple licenses. For example, in the music 
industry, copynght collectives have 
evolved to facilitate licensing transactions 
so that broadcasters and other producers 
may readily obtain permission to use 
numerous copyrighted works held by dif- 
ferent owners. Similarly, in the automo- 
bile, aircraft manufacturing, and synthetic 
rubber industries, patent pools have 
emerged, sometimes with the help of gov- 
ernment, when licenses under multiple 
patent rights have been necessary to 
develop important new products. When 
the background legal rules threaten to 
waste resources people often rearrange 
rights sensibly and create order through 
private arrangements. Perhaps some of the 
problems caused by proliferating 
upstream patent rights in biomedical 
research will recede as licensors and 
licensees gain experience with intellectual 
property rights and institutions evolve to 
help owners and users reach agreements. 
The short-term costs from delayed devel- 
opment of new treatments for disease may 
be worth incurring if fragmented privati- 
zation allows upstream research to pay its 
own and helps to ensure its long-n~n via- 
bility Patent barriers to product develop- 
ment may be a transitional phenomenon 
rather than an enduring tragedy 
On the other hand, there may be rea- 
sons to fear that patent anticommons 
could prove more intractable in biomed- 
ical research than in other settings. 
Because patents matter more to the phar- 
maceutical and biotechnology industries 
than to other industries, firms in these 
industries may be less willing to partici- 
pate in patent pools that undermine the 
gains from exclusivity Moreover, the lack 
of substitutes for certain biomedical dis- 
coveries (such as patented genes or recep- 
tors) may increase the leverage of some 
patent holders, thereby aggravating hold- 
out problems. kvals may not be able to 
invent around patents in research aimed 
at understanding the genetic basis of dis- 
eases as they occur in nature. 
More generally, three structural con- 
cerns caution against uncritical reliance 
on markets and norms to solve biomed- 
ical anticommons tragedy: the transaction 
costs of rearranging entitlements, hetero- 
geneous interests of owners, and cognitive 
biases among researchers. 
Transaction Costs of Bundling 
Rights. High transaction costs may be an 
enduring impediment to efficient 
bundling of intellectual property rights in 
biomedical research. First, many upstream 
patent owners are public institutions with 
limited resources for absorbing transaction 
costs and limited competence in fast-paced, 
market-oriented bargaining. Second, the 
rights involved cover a diverse set of tech- 
niques, reagents, DNA sequences, and 
instruments. Difficulties in comparing the 
values of these patents will l~kely impede 
develo~ment of a standard distribution 
scheme. Third, the heterogeneity of inter- 
ests and resources among public and pri- 
vate patent owners may complicate the 
emergence of standard license terms, 
requiring costly case-by-case negotiations. 
Fourth, licensing transaction costs are 
likely to arise early in the course of R&D 
when the outcome of a project is uncer- 
tain, the potential gains are speculative, 
and it is not yet clear that the value of 
downstream products justifies the trouble 
of overcoming the anticommons. 
Even when upstream owners see 
potential gains from cooperation and are 
motivated to devise mechanisms for 
reducing transaction costs, they may be 
deterred by other legal constraints, such 
as antitrust laws. Patent pools have been a 
target of antitrust scrutiny in the past, 
which may explain why few, if any, such 
pools exist today Although antitn~st law 
may be less hostile to patent pools today 
than it was in 1975 when a consent 
decree dismantled the aircraft patent pool, 
the antitrust climate changes from one 
administration to the next. Even a remote 
prospect of facing treble damages and an 
injunction may give firms pause about 
entering into such agreements. 
Heterogeneous Interests of Rights 
Holders. Intellectual property rights in 
upstream biomedical research belong to a 
large, diverse group of owners in the pub- 
lic and private sectors with divergent 
institutional agendas. Sometimes hetero- 
geneity of interests can facilitate mutually 
agreeable allocations (you take the credit, 
I'll take the money), but in this setting 
there are reasons to fear that owners will 
have conflicting agendas that make it diffi- 
cult to reach agreement. For example, a 
politically-accountable government agency 
such as NIH may further its public health 
mission by using its intellectual property 
rights to ensure widespread availability of 
new therapeutic products at reasonable 
prices. When NIH sought to establish its 
co-ownership of patent rights held by 
Burroughs-Wellcome on the use of AZT to 
treat HIV, its purpose was to lower the 
price of AZT and promote public health 
rather than simply to maximize its finan- 
cial return. By contrast, a private firm is 
more likely to use intellectual property to 
maintain a lucrative monopoly on a high- 
priced product. When owners have con- 
flicting goals, and each can deploy its 
rights to block the strategies of the others, 
they may not be able to reach an agree- 
ment that leaves enough private value for 
downstream developers to bring products 
to market. 
A more subtle conflict in agendas arises 
between owners that pursue end product 
development and those that focus primar- 
ily on upstream research. The goal of end 
product development may be better 
served by making patented research tools 
widely available on a nonexclusive basis, 
whereas the goal of procuring upstream 
research funding may be better served by 
offering exclusive licenses to sponsors or 
research partners. Differences among 
patent owners in their tolerance for trans- 
action costs may further complicate the 
emergence of informal licensing norms. 
Universities may be ill-equipped to handle 
multiple transactions for acquiring licens- 
es to use research tools. Delays in negoti- 
ating multiple agreements to use patented 
processes, reagents, and gene fragments 
could stifle the creative give-and-take of 
academic research. Yet academic researchers 
who fail to adopt new discoveries and 
instead rely on obsolete public domain 
technologies may find themselves losing 
grant competitions. Large corporations 
with substantial legal departments may 
have considerably greater resources for 
negotiating licenses on a case-by-case 
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L 
d stmt:ap firm. R& ns)mrmctry may 
mdk Irt~&sB,m~lt to identify mutually 
advmtn~orr~ cross-liedng mmge- 
mats.  Patent m m  are $so likely to dif- 
fer h tZlc rime b m e s  they can tolerate for 
recouping curtent investments in transac- 
tion costs. 
offmers are also likely to differ in their 
willin- and nb* to i&&e the 
patents of o w ,  leading to asymmetrical 
mativations to negotiate cross-licenses. 
Use of a patented invention in an academ- 
ic laboratory or a small start-up h may 
be inconspicuous, at least if not described 
in a publication or at a scientific meeting. 
Patent owners may still be more reluctant 
to sue public sector investigators than 
they are to sue private firms. Differences 
in institutional cultures may make acade- 
mic laboratories and biotechnology firms 
more tolerant of patent infringement than 
large phamceutical firms. Owners who 
do not feel vulnerable to infringement lia- 
bility may be lcss motivated to enter into 
reasonable cm&-licenses than owners who 
worry more about being sued. 
Cognitive Biases. People consistently 
overestimate the likelihood-that very low 
pr~bability events of high salience will 
occur. For example, many travelers over- 
estimate the danger of an airplane crash 
relative to the hazards of other modes of 
transportation. We suspect that a similar 
bias is likely to cause o m s  of upstream 
bio.rsgdica1 mearch patents to overvalue 
their discoveries. Imagine that one of a set 
of 50 upstream inventions will likely be 
the key to ident ikg an important new 
drug, the m t  of the set will have no prac- 
tical use, and a downstream product 
developer is wllling to pay $10 million for 
the set. Assuming no owner knows ex 
ante which invention will be the key a 
rational owner should be willing to sell 
her patent for the probabilistic value of 
$200,000. However, if each owner overes- 
timates the likelihood that her patent will 
be the key. then each will demand more 
than the probabilistic value, the upstream 
owners collectively will demand more 
than the aggregate market value of their 
inputs, the downstream user will decline 
the offers, and the new drug will not be 
developed. Individuals trained in deter- 
ministic rather than probabilistic diwi- ' 
plinu nn g a a d l y  &lyY[o m e m b  
to hh ~ ~ t t  af error, -. 
A related "attribution biasn suggests 
that pwplr systematically overvalw their 
assets and disparage the claims of their 
opponents when in competition with oth- 
ers. We suspect that attribution bias is 
pervasive among xientists because it is 
likely adapafie for the research eriterprise 
as a whale. Over-commiwnt by individ- 
uals to pa~picular esearch approaches 
ensures that no hypothesis is dismissed 
too quickly, and skepticism toward rivals' 
claims ensures that they are not too read- 
ly accepted. But this bias can invrfere 
with clear-headed bargainmg, leading 
owners to overvalue their own patents, 
undervalue o t h e ~ '  patents, and reject rea- 
sonable offers. Institutional ownership 
could mitigate these biws, but technolo- 
gy transfer offices rely on scientists to 
evaluate their discoveries. When two or 
more patent owners each hope to domi- 
nate the product market. the history of 
biotechnology patent litigation suggests a 
likelihood that bargaining will fail. 
CONCLUSION 
like transition to free markets in post- 
socialist economies, privatization of bio- 
me&cal m a r c h  offers both promises and 
risks. It promises to spur privateSiinvest- 
ment, but risks creating a tragedy of the 
anticommons through a proliferation of 
fragmented and overlapping intellectual 
property rights. An anticommow in bio- 
me&cal research may be more likely to 
endure than in other areas of intellectual 
property because of high transaction costs 
of bargaining, heterogeneous interests 
among owners, and cognitive biases of 
researchers. Privatization must be more 
carefully deployed if it is to serve the pub- 
lic goals of biomedical research. Policy- 
makers should seek to ensure coherent 
boundaries of upstream patents and to 
minimize restrictive licensing practices 
that interfere with downstream product 
development. Otherwise, more upstream 
nghts may lead paradoxically to fewer 
useful products for improving human 
health. 
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